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The structure of a social dilemma lies behind many environmental problems. Mingling temporal 
aspects of resources with the structure of the social dilemma often leads to wrong conclusions. 
Therefore, it is worth analytically separating temporal aspects from structural aspects of the di-
lemma. This article concentrates solely on the structural aspects of the dilemma and the grades of 
complexity with respect to the number and stakes of the people involved, as well as the asymme-
try of endowments and the salience of the optimal use of the resource in order to come close to 
the welfare optimum. Dilemmas with sufficient complexity are extremely vulnerable to individ-
ual defectors, and therefore institutions are necessary for the solution of the dilemma. Conse-
quently, research in environmental psychology should not only target the individuals, but focus 
on institutional design with respect to (1) the structural diagnosis of environmental dilemmas; (2) 
methods that provide an insight into the structural problem of environmental dilemmas; (3) the 
impact of institutions on internalizing norms; and (4) the impact of structural knowledge about 
the dilemma of accepting institutions that help to solve the environmental dilemma. In analogy to 
software-ergonomics, psychology should initiate research in institutional ergonomics that helps 
to create addressee-friendly institutions. 
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 1   The social dilemma in environmental problems and the  
imperative of institutions 
We are drastically endangering nature and species. Almost every nature museum demonstrates to 
us the increasing destruction of nature. Nowadays, many people are aware of this background 
and the threat. Nevertheless, the destruction of biodiversity continues. When homo sapiens 
knows about his role in wreaking havoc, why does he continue such behavior? Does the moraliz-
ing finger prevent these harmful consequences? Should we shame car drivers, fishermen and air 
passengers? This does not help much, if the addressees are in a social dilemma, a situation where 
the  reason benefiting the community is in contrast to the individual rationality of a homo 
oeconomicus. 
Beyond many environmental problems, there is the structure of a social dilemma. Since Hardin 
(cf. 1968), environmental social dilemmas are tagged as “the tragedy of the commons”, and it is 
well known in environmental psychology that many environmental problems are social dilem-
mas: “The-tragedy-of-the-commons process underlies most problems of environmental pollution, 
just as it underlies the depletion of most natural resources” (Gardner & Stern, 1996, p. 25).  
However, and this is the first central issue of my article, many of the current approaches that aim 
at changing the individuals’ values, attitudes or norms are inadequate for the solution of the di-
lemma. Complex dilemmas need institutional solutions, and institutional solutions need the ac-
ceptance of their addressees. The addressees’ acceptance of institutions crucially depends on the 
insight into the problem the institution is designed to solve. Therefore, and this is the second cen-
tral issue of my article, addressees should know that they are involved in a social dilemma. 
Transparency about the dilemma can make it clear to individuals why a specific institutional 
change is necessary, and why a corresponding institution exists. Gardner and Stern (1996) allude 
to the fact that the people involved in a social dilemma and in causing destruction are mostly 
innocent, because “each is powerless to stop the process via unilateral individual action” (p. 26). 
This insight is important, because it implies that solutions targeting behavioral change in indi-
vidual addressees – like changing attitudes – may fail due to the lack of power in individual ac-
tion, and hence institutional design is necessary. However, institutional design itself may be effi-
cient and inefficient, and part of the efficiency or inefficiency of institutions can be explained by 
psychology. This leads to the third issue of my article, i.e., that psychology should participate in 
the interdisciplinary research on institutional design, and enrich current approaches in institu-
tional design, like for instance Epstein’s “simple rules for a complex world” (1997) with psycho-
logical knowledge.  
It seems obvious that psychological research could contribute with a rich knowledge, but until 
now in environmental psychology this approach to environmental problems is scarce, whereas in 
political science and in economics there is empirical and theoretic research about institutional 
design for solving social dilemmas (for instance E. Ostrom, 1990; E. Ostrom, Gardner, & 
Walker, 1994). Psychological research could and should contribute to the goal to design citizen-
friendly institutions – institutions that are transparent with respect to the necessity and the con-3 
tent of monitoring and sanctioning and salient with respect to the goal to reach common welfare 
by the prevention of harmful mutual defections. 
It is important to note that this role that psychology could take in the context of environmental 
dilemmas is different from current approaches in environmental psychology that focus on atti-
tude changes and values of the addressees – not only with respect to general environmental prob-
lems, but also specifically in environmental dilemmas like, for instance, in the context of biodi-
versity conservation (Saunders, 2003; Saunders, Brook, & Myers jr., 2007). From my point-of-
view, the appliance of such approaches runs the risk of underestimating the dynamics of the es-
calation in social dilemmas, when self-interested people continue their (legal) acts and affront 
people who renounce pursuing their self-interest due to conservation goals. And if enough peo-
ple are involved in the dilemma like the commons dilemma, approaches without institutions – or, 
as Hardin (1994) puts it, “without management” – lead to a disaster. “Scale effect rules out the 
unmanaged commons as an important political possibility in the modern world” (Hardin, 1994, 
p. 199) 
From all that has been revealed by social-dilemma research in the labs and in the field about so-
cial values (cf. for instanceYamagishi, 1988), and assuming that environmental values are highly 
correlated with social values, it can well be speculated that it is a matter of time before people 
with environmental values and attitudes abandon their positive and sustaining behavior as a re-
sult of frustration and fear of being ruined. Many environmental problems are social dilemmas 
where the individual’s attempt to act in a sustainable manner may lead to the loss of his/her live-
lihood (like, for instance, in fishery conflicts), because acting in a sustainable manner when the 
others do not means bankruptcy. Therefore, besides psychological approaches concentrating on 
attitudes and values, in such dilemmas we need institutional solutions. However, we also need 
psychological expertise to find citizen-friendly institutions that get through to the addressees. 
Very few articles about institutional design can be found in psychological databases like Psy-
cInfo (quite recently, a book review by E. Ostrom, 2008 on Rothenstein's “Institutional design 
and social traps” could be found). Therefore, it is worth mentioning briefly what institutional 
design is about: “Institutional design is concerned with the choice of decision-making arrange-
ments that will provide the means that are appropriate to the realization [of] specifiable objec-
tives, consequences or ends in view. Any practical man of action who is concerned with organiz-
ing the efforts of many individuals in a joint enterprise is necessarily involved in problems of 
institutional analysis and design” (V. Ostrom & Hennessey 1972, note to the reader). The deci-
sion-making arrangements are organized with rules. “Most of the research that attempts to com-
pare alternative institutional arrangements views institutions as fairly stable sets of commonly 
recognized formal and informal rules that constrain the behavior of individuals in social interac-
tions” (Weimer, 1995, p. 2f.). In order to guarantee the compliance of the addressees, monitoring 
and sanctioning are important instruments, and in the context of environmental dilemmas like 
common pool resources, the adequate design of monitoring and sanctioning is extremely impor-4 
tant for the maintenance of common welfare (cf. E. Ostrom, 1990).
1 Although, in institutional 
design, controls and sanctioning are such important instruments - especially in coping with social 
dilemmas, environmental psychology has little to say about the conditions under which the ad-
dressees are willing to accept such controls and sanctioning. Indeed, it is a hard task to design 
monitoring and controls such that they are not an assault on individual autonomy – both from a 
political and a psychological point-of-view. If institutions are malformed, controls and sanction-
ing will be perceived as a spurious assault from outside, although they are intended to help to 
overcome the tragedy and to raise the common welfare. 
From the angle of institutional design, monitoring and sanctioning is necessary for the sake of 
the environment. From the addressees’ point-of-view, it should be fair and the functional role in 
solving a problem that touches them should be obvious. Therefore, we need psychological ap-
proaches that take into account both the structure of the dilemma and the psychology of the ad-
dressees themselves. In order to come closer to such approaches that consider the three issues 
already mentioned above, (1) the structure of the dilemma, (2) the knowledge of the addressees 
about the dilemma, and (3) institutional solutions that are accepted and supported by the address-
ees, it is worth taking a closer look at such interactions between the structure of the dilemma and 
the addressees.  
The paper is structured as follows. Based on the motivation of this section (1), the next section 
(2) introduces a mussel-fishery conflict as a relevant illustration. The illustration is used to dem-
onstrate that it makes sense to detach temporal aspects and to concentrate on the formal and 
structural aspects of the proper dilemma. In section (3), I argue that environmental dilemmas are 
often extremely difficult, because the stakeholders are in a veil of ignorance about the dilemma 
structure. The concluding paragraphs of section (3) are devoted to the question of how environ-
mental dilemmas can be solved. Section (4) investigates the scope of reciprocal strategic reac-
tions of stakeholders intended to come to common welfare, demonstrating that the success and 
applicability of such strategies stands in a close dependence to the complexity and structural 
form of the dilemma. Section (5) resumes that the scope of aches that focus on changing indi-
viduals’ behavior is limited, and that complex dilemmas need institutional solutions with con-
trols and sanctioning mechanisms, because a single defector could destroy most or all of the co-
operation efforts of many others. Therefore, complex environmental dilemmas need institutional 
solutions. Based on this insight the article establishes the programmatic vision that psychology 
engages in institutional ergonomics with the goal of designing citizen-friendly institutions, i.e., 
to create institutions that are not only efficient with respect to the structural modifications, but 
also with respect to the functionality, transparency and ease towards the addressees. The en-
gagement in such goals would foster interdisciplinarity of environmental psychology with a sig-
nificant increase of psychological research in institutional design. Last, but not least, it would 
help to improve substantially the institutional solutions for environmental dilemmas. 
                                        
1   In the following, I talk about common welfare, but it is rather obvious that common welfare in the context of 
environmental dilemmas touches upon sustainability. However, sustainability is also important with respect 
to temporal aspects that I do not wish to discuss in this article. Therefore, the term common welfare is used in 
the following. 5 
2   An example: The social dilemma in mussel fishery 
For the following illustrations, we consider an idealized mussel-cropping and mussel-fishery 
conflict in the 1990s that took place in the Wadden Sea, a special ecosystem and part of the 
North Sea at the Dutch, German and Danish coast. A collapse was threatening, but political at-
tempts to introduce protectorates were extremely difficult due to the resistance of the mussel-
fishermen. “Fisheries continued harvesting the already low stocks, which resulted in a food 
shortage for birds and, as a result, high bird mortality. This attracted a lot of media attention” 
(Turnhout, Hisschemöller, & Eijsackers, 2008). The authors mention that a Dutch newspaper 
(Handelsblad) even spoke of ‘the great cockle robbery’ and of an ‘ecological disaster’. A Ger-
man newspaper (taz) described contradicting views from fishermen and scientists on the harm-
lessness or harmfulness, respectively, of mussel-fishery (Stadie, 1999). “Less is more”, is the 
message from politicians and scientists in such situations. This message is true due to the di-
lemma structure of the problem: if all fishermen take less, their yields will be higher.  
However, from the fishermen’s view, this seems like promising a miracle, or like a lie. Their 
statistics from everyday business give a different answer. The very simplest form of a social di-
lemma, originally called the “prisoners’ dilemma”, can demonstrate why this is possible, and it 
can well be that the fishermen’s evaluation is on a sound but incomplete base, and that this is the 
reason why they come up with the wrong conclusions. 
Table 1: The prisoners’ dilemma in the context of mussel-fishery 
 
   Fisherman  2 
    Fish much  Fish restrained 













Fish restrained (B)  0, 12  8, 8 
 
Table 1 gives the very simplest form of an environmental dilemma with the structure of the well 
known prisoners’ dilemma (cf. Luce & Raiffa, 1957). There are only two stakeholders (individu-
als or interest groups) and only two choices to select from. Nevertheless, like all environmental 
dilemmas, the prisoners’ dilemma is a serious conflict between individual rationality and collec-
tive reason (Poundstone, 1992). The stakeholder may be greedy and therefore decide to fish 
much, or he may fear that the opponent will be defective and therefore decide to fish much as 
well. Thus, different motives may lead to defection: the fear of fear, the fear of greed and the 
greed itself. The prisoners’ dilemma illustrates how the structural properties of a situation may 
lead to severe conflicts of interest and conflicts of motive. It is hard to remain cooperative if the 
others defect, and cooperative persons are in the pretty neurotic situation of being the naive do-
gooder (this aspect has already been well described in Hardin, 1968). 6 
In this highly abstracted and idealized situation, the individual fisherman can either harvest much 
or he/she can harvest sustainably. However, in contrast to many laboratory experiments with so-
cial dilemmas, it is important to note that fisherman 1 usually only has access to the information 
put in bold in the table. In this case, the conflict described above becomes obvious or at least 
plausible. In our highly condensed abstraction, the fisherman can only decide “A” (much) or “B” 
(restrained and sustainable) and in dependence of his decision he gets sometimes 4 or 12 and 
sometimes 0 or 8, respectively.
2 His individual statistics show him that “A” is better than “B”, 
and so he will pursue to choose “A” as long as he is under this veil of ignorance about the social 
interdependencies and the harmful consequences (in contrast to the positive implications of 
Rawls’ (1971) veil of ignorance). By looking at these individual statistics, he quickly learns that 
“A” is the better option on the average. In this case, he is blind about the matrix in which he has 
made his decisions, and therefore his decision is without the intention to harm others, although 
his decision is related with negative externalities (see also Gifford, 2006, p. 26). However, it is 
also clear that well-informed people can strategically feign ignorance in order to keep the right to 
pursue self-interests. 
This characterization of the mussel fishery conflict as a social dilemma might remind one of the 
example of the extinction of king crabs given in Gardner & Stern (1996). However, in contrast to 
their analysis, I try to separate the structural aspect of the social dilemma from temporal aspects 
and temporal uncertainty, in order to concentrate on solutions that are appropriate to overcome 
the dilemma. This is in contrast to recent publications (like Milfont & Gouveia, 2006) that 
mainly base findings on Joireman, Van Lange, & Van Vugt (2004), who argued that in order to 
understand inconsistencies between social values and commuting behavior it is necessary to 
broaden the social dilemma such that it involves both the social conflict and the temporal con-
flict. Although at first glance their argument contradicts the following analysis, it fits well be-
cause their argument is that in the concrete intervention we have to consider both the temporal 
aspects and the dilemma (in the narrow sense) of an environmental problem. However, and this 
is in contrast to Joireman, Van Lange, & Van Vugt (2004), with respect to analysis of the situa-
tion it is necessary to disentangle both conflicts, because the temporal aspect of the dilemma 
needs other interventions than the structural aspect, and that especially the structural aspect of 
the dilemma necessitates institutional solutions. The same is true for the diagnosis of the situa-
tion: The temporal implications need other psychological instruments (like questionnaires) than 
the structural implications. In many publications about environmental problems, we can find a 
motivation about the social dilemma, but in the ongoing analysis, the structural aspect gets lost 
and it is mainly the temporal aspect that is in the focus (like, for instance Miller, 2007, or, in con-
trast to their claim, Milfont & Gouveia, 2006). Confounding the temporal and structural aspects 
can lead to misleading conclusions like the following: “The pursuit of individual self interest 
causes no problems as long as the total rate at which the fishers catch crabs – determined by the 
                                        
2   In this and the following examples, I abstain from an interpretation of these numbers as payoffs or yields, 
because a concrete interpretation is irrelevant for the purpose of this paper to illustrate the interaction of 
structure and efficacy of different instruments to solve the dilemma. In experiments in the lab, the numbers 
are usually transformed in payoffs for the participating subjects. 7 
numbers of fishers times the number each catches – does not exceed the rate at which the crab 
population can naturally replenish itself” (Gardner & Stern, 1996, p. 24). This citation stems 
from a very influential and important book about environmental problems. So much the worse 
that with respect to environmental dilemmas the authors probably did not see that the pursuit of 
self-interest in a social dilemma may very well cause problems - even in completely recovering 
resources without the consequence of the resource itself being menaced.
3  
An example may illustrate this point: the water supply on the Canaries can be understood to be a 
completely self-replenishing resource; however, the annual total of precipitation varies ex-
tremely. Nevertheless, even if the rainfall were constant over the years, it would be a social di-
lemma. The fresh-water on the Canaries is extracted from the lava. Because of the high perme-
ability of the lava, any barrier is merely temporary and partial, and all extractions of water on 
each of the Canary Islands is interdependent with other extractions on the same island. The water 
extraction on each island “exhibits the property of a common” (Ostmann, 1995, p. 2). Due to this 
underlying social dilemma of a common-pool resource, there are serious problems because dif-
ferent parties (like hotel owners and farmers) extract water with wells and sinter galleries. The 
investment in devices for water extraction is far beyond the welfare optimum, because in conse-
quence, two parties drain off each other’s water supply.. 
Therefore, it makes sense to separate temporal aspects analytically from structural aspects. This 
separation makes it possible to classify environmental problems in a 2x2 crosstab where social 
dilemma in the narrow sense (yes/no) is crossed with temporal conflict (yes/no).  
Table 2: A 2x2-table of environmental problems 
 
   Social  conflict 
    yes (i.e., social dilemmas)  no 




















no Canary-Islands   
water conflict 
Natural disaster  
(such as tsunami) 
 
In the following, the article at hand concentrates on the structural aspects, i.e., the first column in 
the 2x2-classification (cf. table 2). 
                                        
3   On the other hand, Gardner & Stern (1996) are completely right with the statement that the size of a popula-
tion or use of a resource plays an important role whether a dilemma comes up or not – Hardin (2007) tags 
this as “scale effects”. This aspect points to a structural aspect of the environmental problem, and not to a 
temporal one. Moreover, they are completely right that in many environmental dilemmas with time dynamics 
the use rate is above the recovering rate of the resource. This points to a time-dynamical aspect of environ-
mental resources, that can also tangle resources without the structure of a social dilemma. 8 
3   Environmental social dilemmas typically are under a harmful veil 
of ignorance 
Many environmental dilemmas are much harder than dilemmas that are investigated in the labo-
ratory, because in the context of many environmental problems with dilemma structures, the 
stakeholder cannot see the social interdependencies. He does not see the impact of his decision 
on the outcome of others, and potentially even does not know that others are affected by his de-
cision. Until now we have little empirical knowledge about such “blind” social dilemmas: „By 
and large, however, this literature [about learning in games] is concerned with learning how to 
play a game rather than with learning about a game“(Oechsler & Schipper, 2003, p. 137). A re-
cent study from Nicklisch (2006) examines learning in different 2x2 games with minimal infor-
mation setting, but without social-dilemma games. Therefore, it until now it is a reasonable 
speculation to assume that if the stakeholders have no insight in the structure of the “game”, i.e., 
the social interdependencies of the decisions with other stakeholders, it seems rather obvious that 
they cannot believe the scientific and political claims that less is more in such situations. 
Taking for granted that this assumption is true, any approach in environmental dilemmas should 
care about data that give information whether the stakeholders are aware of the dilemma in 
which they are trapped. Solutions for environmental dilemmas should provide for a transparent 
access to information about the others’ behavior and vice versa, about the social interdependen-
cies in the outcomes, and about the whole structure of the dilemma with the welfare optimum 
and equilibrium based on self-interest falling apart. It is an important step to create transparency 
about this fact, namely that self-interested decisions lead to sub-optimal decisions in the end, and 
that cooperative solutions may yield better outcomes. Until now, we have barely data from 
stakeholders about such knowledge. It is also important to see that a stakeholder’s knowledge 
about the existence of a “win-win situation” would not be sufficient, because it grasps only half 
of the environmental dilemma, because an understanding of the vulnerability and instability of 
the win-win situation is also important for the establishment of institutional and sustainable solu-
tions. 
The following sections are devoted to the question of how environmental dilemmas can be 
solved. One important module for the solution of environmental dilemmas is the stakeholder’s 
insight in the dilemma structure. However, as far as I know, until now there is neither environ-
ment-psychological research nor social-psychological research with respect to the goal of giving 
insight into the dilemma that traps stakeholders. As an apparent consequence, there is no nature 
museum either that could explain to us the dilemma structure of many environmental problems, 
and that would try to give an answer to the question why stakeholders often make decisions that 
destroy nature, despite the knowledge about the consequences of their decisions.  
Experimental games could be used as an efficient instrument that gives insight in the structure 
and social interdependencies of environmental dilemmas - for education and mediation as well. 
We usually only come up with some punching bags and find them guilty of causing the disaster – 9 
greed and immoderateness. However, it is important to see that the tragedy of environmental 
destruction may also result from mere struggle for existence in a social dilemma. 
Given that the stakeholders see that they are trapped in a social dilemma, there are two paths for 
the solution of this dilemma: (1) The stakeholders can try to help themselves by making use of 
reciprocal strategies. Here again, experimental games could also be used to illustrate the virtue of 
reciprocal strategies. (2) The stakeholders could strive for institutional solutions that afford sus-
tainability in the future. However, often the stakeholders are trapped in the dilemma, and they 
need institutional solutions. In the following two sections, we will first consider the scope of re-
ciprocal strategies and then the scope of institutional design for the solution of environmental 
dilemmas. 
4   Reciprocal strategies in environmental dilemmas with different 
complexity 
If decisions in an environmental dilemma have to be made repeatedly, the stakeholder can make 
use of reciprocal strategies. Note that in repeated dilemmas, time plays a role because of the 
repetitions, but this can nevertheless be strictly distinguished from the time dynamics of the re-
source itself. Therefore, in the structural analysis of the dilemma it is important to consider 
whether the environmental dilemma situation is a one-shot situation or a situation in a repeated 
setting with the same stakeholders, because - in contrast to the time dynamics - this makes an 
important difference from a structural point-of-view. Reciprocal strategies in repeated dilemmas 
open the stakeholders’ floor to defend against defections. 
4.1   Reciprocity in a simple prisoners’ dilemma 
In table 1, we found the very simplest form of an environmental dilemma. What happens if the 
two stakeholders (like the mussel fishermen in the example) have to repeat this game again and 
again, and one of the stakeholders would like to come to a cooperative solution? Many textbooks 
on prisoners’ dilemmas mention that in that case the stakeholder could try tit-for-tat, a reciprocal 
strategy that begins with cooperation and then always imitates the action of the opponent in the 
period before. However, due to the veil of ignorance mentioned before, this strategy could fail in 
environmental dilemmas. It important that the stakeholder can easily obtain information about 
both the others’ behavior and the others’ outcomes, and vice versa; otherwise, reciprocal strate-
gies make no sense. 
Axelrod (1984) shows that tit-for-tat is a strategy that never wins any repeated game with a part-
ner – the best result that tit-for-tat can reach with respect to the comparative advantage to the 
partner is a draw. Nevertheless, tit-for-tat will outperform any other strategy, if the strategy has 
to complete an iterated (i.e., repeated) prisoners’-dilemma game again and again, with other 
strategies in a tournament where each strategy is confronted with another to play the iterated 10 
prisoners’ dilemma. In the long run – i.e., in the course of such a tournament – tit-for-tat, on the 
one hand, ensures the benefits of cooperation and, on the other, avoids being unconditionally 
exploited. A seemingly paradox characteristic of tit-for-tat is often overlooked: this strategy will 
never win compared to any opponent or partner in a single iterated prisoners’ dilemma. Never-
theless, after many iterated prisoners’ dilemmas, it is the winner of the tournament. Two signals 
of tit-for-tat are important with respect to the attributes of the communication: (1) I want to co-
operate and (2) If you do not cooperate with me, I will defend myself with no cooperation. Tit-
for-tat signals both benevolence and strength, leading to high benefits of cooperation if the other 
also cooperates (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). 
(Delahaye & Mathieu, 1998) introduced some variations in the structure of Axelrod’s (1984) 
tournament that lead to a modified picture, if the structure of the tournament is modified and new 
strategic options (like abrogation) are introduced. Nevertheless, in concordance to Axelrod, they 
also conclude that the principles of the successful strategies are as plausible as tit-for-tat. The 
strategies integrate the concrete structure of the dilemma-rules with the principal ideas of recip-
rocity. 
Taking these conclusions from simulations, and trying to transfer ideas of reciprocity on envi-
ronmental dilemmas, information policy is extremely important. The addressees need informa-
tion about the others’ reactions and the common consequences of their decisions. Given such 
information, reciprocal strategies could be helpful to come to solutions of environmental dilem-
mas that are simple with respect to their complexity. However, slight modifications of complex-
ity can already impose severe embarrassments .to reciprocal strategies. I will discuss some of 
these modifications in the next subsections: asymmetry (4.2.), scale effects (4.3.) and non-
linearity of the common result (4.5). In section (4.4) I argue that on the other hand an enrichment 
of environmental dilemmas with graduated options can alleviate the applicability of reciprocal 
strategies. 
4.2   Reciprocity in case of asymmetry 
Even this simplest form of an environmental dilemma with two stakeholders and two options, 
respectively, can be enriched in complexity by introducing asymmetry. In this case, it is much 
harder to reach welfare and cooperation. Due to allocation conflicts that come up, the success of 
tit-for-tat is much worse. Distributive justice plays a crucial role in conflicts with such asymme-
tries.  11 
Table 3: The asymmetric dilemma 
 
   Fisherman  2 
    Fish much  Fish much 
Fish much  
(A) 















0, 18  8, 12 
 
A reason for such asymmetries could be different costs of access to the resource, such that one 
fisherman ends up better off both in mutual defection and in mutual cooperation. Due to this 
asymmetry, the “weaker” or poorer fisherman with worse conditions may desire to equalize the 
disadvantage by casual defections. Data from the lab indicate such an interpretation. In asymmet-
ric prisoners’ dilemmas the phases of cooperation are much shorter and long phases of coopera-
tion are extremely rare compared to the symmetric dilemmas (Beckenkamp, Hennig-Schmidt, & 
Maier-Rigaud, 2006). If the stakeholder in the stronger position reacts to the defection of the 
weaker stakeholder with tit-for-tat, he undermines the equalization-idea of the weaker stake-
holder. In such cases, the underlying idea of tit-for-tat to maximize common welfare comes in 
conflict with subjective justice-sentiments concerning equality. Magen (in preparation) assumes 
that dilemma experiments with unequal endowments reveal the ambiguity of fairness criteria in 
almost every experiment about asymmetric social dilemmas (see also Magen, 2006). 
Due to such justice-conflicts, there is a special dynamic in asymmetric prisoners’ dilemmas. 
Structural solutions that help to maintain welfare may become necessary. A simple solution 
could be to create a platform for negotiations about side-payments. Another solution could be to 
keep the situation deliberately opaque with respect to the benefits (such a solution can often be 
found with respect to payments of employees). However, this again may yield the problem of 
“blind” dilemmas and the veil of ignorance described before. Another solution consists in giving 
good reasons that justify the inequalities, thus enriching the issue about distributive justice with 
issues about procedural justice (Ittner & Ohl, 2006). 
4.3   Reciprocity and scale effects 
Until now, our focus was on environmental dilemmas with only two stakeholders involved. 
However, in most of the environmental dilemmas there are more than two stakeholders involved. 
A possible extension of the 2-person-dilemma is as follows. In this example, we assume that 
there are 9 mussel-fishermen, and each of them decides either to fish much or to restrain his fish-
ing (cf. table 3).  12 
Table 4: A n-person social dilemma (n=9) 
 
    Number of others fishing restrained 
    0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 














Fish  restrained  0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
If all stakeholders cooperate, each of them earns 8; if, however, four stakeholders cooperate and 
fish restrainedly, then the fisherman under consideration receives 8 if he fishes much and 4 if he 
fishes sustainably. Please note that the payoffs in the corners in the table of this 9-person di-
lemma correspond to the simple 2-person dilemma (table 1). The situation can be graphically 

















Figure 1. A graphical representation of the N-Person-dilemma (cf. table 3) 
 
The two lines in this figure represent the two decisions that the fisherman under consideration 
can make. The upper line gives his result (depending on how many others restrained) if he fishes 
much, and the lower line if he fishes sustainably. Like in the 2-person dilemma, the fisherman is 
always better off if he fishes much, but if this rational consideration is made by all fishermen, 
they will end up with 4 instead of 8 for each of them, if all cooperate (see also van Lange, Lie-13 
brand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992). Therefore, the game-theoretic equilibrium falls apart from the 
welfare optimum, and the welfare optimum is instable because there is always the temptation to 
defect for each of the fishermen. 
Do reciprocal strategies make sense in this simplest form of an N-person-dilemma? No, because 
how to make use of tit-for-tat, if two others fish much and all the others fish sustainably? If, in 
reaction to the defection, those fishermen also fished much, this would make things still worse, 
because if all of the fishermen followed this reciprocal idea, there would be at least 7 persons in 
the next period who fish much, and if the other two continued to fish much, they would all be in 
the inefficient and unsatisfactory equilibrium. This non-applicability of reciprocal strategies in 
such simple N-person game is one reason why cooperation rates usually are much poorer in re-
peated N-person dilemmas than in repeated 2-person dilemmas. Even worse, communication is 
also problematic, because with the growing number of participants in the dilemma, communica-
tion channels and rules are necessary. 
Therefore, it makes sense to strive for institutions to solve this kind of environmental dilemma. 
However, such institutions must not necessarily come from outside or top-down, because historic 
examples and current cases show that self-governance can be possible (E. Ostrom, 1990). How-
ever, Ostrom’s argument should not be overlooked that in these case studies, successful self-
governance always includes monitoring and sanctioning  - even in small groups governing a 
common-pool resource.
4 Nevertheless, self-governance may outperform governance from out-
side, because the efficiency of controls and the adequacy of sanctions are highly dependent on 
context specificities. Often, nobody knows such specificities better than the addressees of institu-
tions themselves. 
4.4   Measure for measure: Reciprocity with graded options of the stakeholders  
Increasing the option space of the participants may help to make reasonable use of reciprocal 
strategies, for instance if each participant, instead of choosing between two options, can choose 
an exploitation rate between 0 and 100. In concrete examples and resources like mussels, it is not 
a trivial task to see what 100% exploitation (i.e., 0% cooperation) and 0% exploitation (i.e., 
100% cooperation) would mean.
5 Given that the relevant poles have been identified – an exploi-
tation rate of 0% corresponds to the sustainable fishing option, and the exploitation rate 100% 
corresponds to fishing much. In literature, such experimental games with extended option spaces 
are called public-good games. The 9-person game in figure 1 would be such a public-good game 
if parallel lines between the upper and lower line were additional options. Therefore, the game-
theoretic structure with the discrepancy between welfare optimum and equilibrium is maintained, 
and the upper line is still the best option from a self-interested point-of-view. However, those 
stakeholders who want to come closer to the welfare optimum get a strategic possibility to make 
                                        
4   Again, this issue stands in contrast to Gardner & Stern (1996, p. 28f). 
5   One reason for this might be the quadratic pay-off function, as we will see in the next section. 14 
reasonable use of tit-for-tat, by taking the average cooperation-rate of the others as the bench-
mark for the own decision. So, for instance, if the others cooperated before with 50%, the stake-
holder would decide to cooperate with 50% as well, if he wants to make use of tit-for-tat in this 
N-person situation. 
Above that, this extension of options opens up the action-space for light variations of tit-for-tat 
even in 2-person-dilemmas. Instead of paying the other out in his own coin, now it is also possi-
ble to lightly attenuate the own reaction. For instance, if the other cooperated with 40%, tit-for-
tat reacts by cooperating with 40% also, but it is also possible to cooperate a little bit more, for 
instance with 45%. In psychology, this reciprocal strategy is called tit-for-tat+ (van Lange, Ou-
werkerk, & Tazelaar, 2002); in economics, it is called “measure for measure (Selten, Mitzkewitz, 
& Uhlich, 1997). The small leap of faith provides the chance of escaping from tit-for-tat traps 
like the arms race, and it can compensate for failures in communication or accomplishment of 
actions. Van Lange et al. demonstrated that this strategy is perceived as strong as tit-for-tat, but 
with respect to other positive psychological attributions and to the ability to de-escalate it is su-
perior.  
Measure for measure seems also to make sense in N-person dilemmas, although empirical stud-
ies are still seldom (Beckenkamp, 1999; E. Ostrom et al., 1994). These studies demonstrate that 
in experimental common-pool resources measure for measure is seldom used. In the fishery ex-
ample, the stakeholder who would want to make use of measure for measure would have to take 
the average quota of the others as a base for his own decision. Sometimes, politics seem to have 
such a strategy in mind when political goals in international negotiations are pursued, and an 
example is given by raising the bars for environmental goals higher than others do. By doing that 
in a way that is adapted to the current level, one can avoid being unconditionally exploited in the 
dilemma, and nevertheless signalize that one wants to achieve higher goals and better coopera-
tion in the dilemma. 
However, all the same it is likely that measure for measure strategies are less successful in N-
person dilemmas compared to 2-person dilemmas. Even if we can take for granted that commu-
nication is clear and visible, so that the signals of willingness to cooperate are unambiguous, it is 
harder to affect a group of stakeholders than to affect a single other stakeholder by making 
merely use of that strategy. On the other hand, it can well be that a rather mild institution that 
could not reasonably reach welfare goals alone works well if part of the participants make use of 
such strategies. Again, this principle is true for international negotiations. The sanctions that can 
be imposed against defecting countries are often far from bringing self-interested stakeholders to 
cooperation for environmental goals. However, besides the mild sanctions there often are stake-
holders who pursue common welfare goals and who make use of measure for measure in order to 
signal that they want to improve the environment, but do not want to do this without the contri-
bution of stakeholders who have behaved in a self-interested fashion until now. 
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4.5  Measure for measure: quadratic resource dilemmas 
Unfortunately, the structure of environmental dilemmas is much more complicated and complex 
than sketched until now, even if we refrain from considering time dynamics. Usually, environ-
mental resources can be both overexploited and underused, so that it is not always clear whether 
a certain action is good for the environment or not. From a structural point-of-view, this property 
of many environmental resources rests upon the non-linearity of the yields (in all the above ex-
amples, the yields were linear) in dependence of the stakes. The yields of many resources and the 
resulting characteristics of the environmental dilemma can well be modeled by using quadratic 
functions (cf. Beckenkamp, 2006; Ostmann, 1995), particularly fishery conflicts at a certain 
point in time (cf. Hartwick & Olewiler, 1998) - again, we want to disregard time dynamics, be-
cause time dynamics may change the shape of the quadratic function, but not the principle quad-
ratic characteristic of the dilemma at a certain point in time.  
This example illustrates that kind of dilemma: four fishermen can send up to ten cutters for har-
vesting mussels on the ground of the sea. Figure 2 gives the yield in dependence of the sum of 
the trawlers sent in total.  
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Figure 2. A graphical illustration of a quadratic environmental dilemma 
 
 16 
The function shows that the maximal yield of 400 is achieved with 20 cutters. If each of the four 
stakeholders sent 5 cutters, then each of them would gain 5/20 * 400 = 100. However, this wel-
fare optimum is not stable, because each of the stakeholders could make the following reasoning 
at this point. “I should send one more cutter out, because then 21 cutters would be at sea, the to-
tal yield would be 399 and I would gain 6/21 * 399 = 114. If I sent 10 cutters, I would even earn 
150.” The tragedy arises again, because each of the stakeholders could reason in such a way 
about the best response, with the result that they end up in the equilibrium with 32 cutters in total 
and a total yield of 256.
6 This is only 64% of the welfare optimum, so that each of them would 
have to bear 36% loss from their original gain. Who, from the stakeholders’ point-of-view, is 
responsible for the tragedy, when they are not aware of the dilemma in which they are trapped? 
It seems rather obvious that in such slightly more complex dilemmas the application of measure 
for measure strategies becomes extremely difficult. In contrast to the linear dilemmas given be-
fore, in this dilemma a single defector can destroy all the attempts of cooperation of the other 
stakeholders: if three fishermen cooperate and use only 5 trawlers each, the fourth fisherman 
could send all he has and make his profits at the disadvantage of the other three. Unfortunately, 
this kind of environmental dilemma is rather typical of many resource dilemmas. It is an envi-
ronmental dilemma that needs institutional support for a sustainable solution.  
Nevertheless, measure for measure strategies might be useful even in such cases, for example in 
order to come to institutions that could solve the problem. Again, it is a necessary precondition 
that the signals and the communication of that strategy are salient. In such a case, the strategy 
would also help the respective stakeholder who makes use of it to build up a reputation. It is 
mostly uncontroversial that such a reputation can help to build up trust – an important first step 
to solve the dilemma (Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2003; Wilson, 1985). Making use of the 
strategy can also help to get support from other stakeholders to build an institution made to solve 
or to attenuate the environmental dilemma. To count only on reputation without institutional lin-
ing, however, is dangerous, because reputation can be used to prepare high stake deceptions. In 
eBay, such cases could often be found; in consequence, they finally led to the implementation of 
much more institutional trust-systems within the eBay-platform. 
5   Institutional ergonomics: Creating citizen-friendly institutions 
The last section investigated the scope of reciprocal strategic reactions of stakeholders intended 
to come to common welfare, demonstrating that the success and applicability of such strategies 
stands in close dependence to the complexity and structural form of the dilemma. It showed that 
particularly resource dilemmas like the mussel-fishery are extremely vulnerable to defections 
coming from minorities. In such cases, institutional solutions are necessary that help to stabilize 
mutual cooperation. This section considers institutional solutions with controls and sanctioning 
mechanisms, and argues that psychology should get in the research about institutional design. 
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Empirical experiences demonstrated that in complex environmental dilemmas, it is hard to con-
vince the individual of their individual impact on the destruction of their basis of existence. 
Many environmental studies report long-lasting mediation processes to overcome environmental 
dilemmas (cf., for instance Ohl et al., 2008).  
Focusing on the structural aspect could lead to new strategies in the mediation process. Poten-
tially, experimental games could help to illustrate the trap stakeholders are locked in and thus to 
accelerate mediation processes. Experimental games can fill this gap. Why not play a dilemma 
game about mussel-fishery with the stakeholders themselves, - a game that is adapted to their 
situation that demonstrates that they could achieve a win-win constellation, but that this constel-
lation is extremely vulnerable? This would be a completely new approach, both in psychology 
and in institutional design. Experimental games can be used both for data acquisition and for 
mediation in the conflict in order to come to a well-integrated institutional design. 
The target-oriented data acquisition with respect to a game-theoretic valid model takes several 
steps. The first step is the identification of the relevant stakeholders within the environmental 
dilemma. How many players are there in the game or, accordingly, how many stakeholders are 
there in the environmental dilemma? This provides the relevant stakeholders of our games, 
sketched out before. Ideally, such studies should be shaped in such a way that the number of dif-
ferent interest groups is small, such that a rather big conflict (as, for instance, the whole Wadden 
Sea conflict is) can be broken down into manageable sub-conflicts. Therefore, instead of inte-
grating the conflict between tourism, mussel-fishery, other forms of fishery and industry in one 
game, it would make sense to take only the fishery conflict as one game and to map other con-
flicts in other games, such that each conflict can be put on its own agenda.  
One the stakeholders of such a manageable conflict have been identified, the second step would 
be to try to identify the relevant action space of the respective stakeholders; this corresponds to 
the rows and columns in the examples given before. Then, in the last step, the ranks in the 
evaluation of the different combinations of actions for each of the stakeholders should be ele-
vated. This corresponds to the cell entries in the tables of the examples before. 
With respect to mussel fishery, the scientific board ETG (Ecotarget group; cf. Turnhout et al., 
2008) could identify relevant stakeholders. These stakeholders could be addressed and asked 
about the options they have and their preferences. The stakeholders and their options could be 
mapped in the matrix and the stakeholder could be asked afterwards about their preferences in 
the outcomes in the matrix, for instance by asking them to rank-order the following outcomes: 
•  You are fishing much, and the others are fishing sustainably 
•  You are fishing sustainably and the others are fishing sustainably 
•  You are fishing much and the others are fishing much 
•  You are fishing sustainably and the others are fishing much 18 
The answers can be used to identify the games the stakeholders play within their relevant options 
with each other. When the “game” is identified, it can be used in confrontation with the stake-
holders in order to check the validity of the diagnostic process. If the game fits well, the diagno-
sis of the environmental problem (which can be an environmental dilemma, but it could also 
have a different, non-dilemma structure) is finished and the same game can be used to illustrate 
the structural problem beyond to the stakeholders. If the game does not fit well, the diagnosis 
itself should be evaluated with respect to the differences between the answers the stakeholders 
gave and the denial of the stakeholders with respect to the game that has been identified on the 
basis of their answers.  
Making use of experimental games in environmental dilemmas in order to come to a valid diag-
nosis of conflicts is one issue where environmental psychology could tie in with institutional 
design. However, until now, institutional design is mainly a topic in political science, law and 
economics. In social conflicts, psychology is mainly used for mediation and strategies of attitude 
and value change in the addressees.  
However, psychology could even do more within this domain, because the diagnosis can be a 
solid fundament for the support in interventions. Many environmental problems are complex 
social dilemmas (Brock & Xepapadeas, 2003) that need both institutional solutions and insight 
into and support of such solutions by the addressees. Given a valid diagnosis of the “game”, i.e., 
a game-theoretic representation of the environmental dilemma that is not denied by the stake-
holders with respect to its relevance and validity in relation to their situation, it can be used as an 
illustration for the stakeholders about their strategic situation. It could also be useful for insights 
about the structural blindness of the stakeholders, before they played the game. In case of a so-
cial dilemma, the game can be used to illustrate that the stakeholders could strive for a win-win 
constellation – however, a win-win situation that is extremely reactive to defections. This raises 
the question of how to stabilize the win-win-constellation, and thus the purpose of institutions 
can be illustrated, and the games used to discuss and prototypically implement different institu-
tional solutions. Both the diagnosis of the environmental dilemma and the intervention with a 
preparation of institutional solutions are tasks that fit psychological research goals and applica-
tions very well. Therefore, psychology could have a much better impact on institutional design. 
Beyond doubt, this is an ambitious task. Until now, psychology is mainly ignored, probably with 
fatal consequences for the environment, because according to current research in psychology and 
other disciplines it can be expected that the success of institutions in solving social dilemmas 
crucially depends on the addressees’ interpretation of the institutions.  
This leads to a further research issue within this integration in interdisciplinary research about 
institutional design. Environmental psychology researches the circumstances under which insti-
tutions are either seen as an intrusion from outside or as a help in solving a pressing problem. 
Institutions can only be successful if the latter is true, and psychology can contribute with re-
search and know-how. This research is closely related to psychological research about justice 
and justice sensitivity (like, for instance, Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 2005).  19 
Above that, psychological research should not only be concerned with improving institutions, 
but also with changing the impact of institutions on internalized norms. Both injunctive norms 
and descriptive norms are favorable for the solution of environmental dilemmas, and descriptive 
and injunctive norms are in a positive interaction (Thogersen, 2008). Institutions probably play 
an important role in inducing cooperation in environmental dilemmas by modifying the belief 
that others cooperate (descriptive norm), and by modifying the belief that relevant others expect 
one to cooperate (injunctive norms). Within the domain of institutional design, psychological 
research about the role of institutions on the internalization of descriptive and injunctive norms is 
important. Under normal circumstances, controls and sanctions are usually bad. However, con-
trols and sanctions can also be important to give positive signals on what society expects from 
the individual and what the individual can expect others to do.  
This issue is closely connected to the question of what role a structural insight into the dilemma 
problem plays, which the institution is about to solve? Should the research demonstrate that insti-
tution acceptance crucially depends on the insight into the problem the institution is about to 
solve, this research would be extremely important Although psychology is rich in relevant 
knowledge about how to give addressees insight in environmental problems, it does not yet have 
much experience about different methods that facilitate the insight into environmental social di-
lemmas. This research could tie into a long tradition in psychological research about social di-
lemmas (cf. Liebrand, van Lange, & Messick, 1996).  
Institutions should be easy to understand, and it should be easy to understand what institutions 
expect in a given situation. Institutional design should turn to the question of institutional ergo-
nomics (Beckenkamp, 2004), and by doing that, psychology could earn an important and signifi-
cant role. In political science, it is well known that institutions that are made to solve environ-
mental social dilemmas – or, to be more specific, common-pool resource problems – have to be 
transparent, comprehensible and fair. According to Dietz, Ostrom and Stern (2003) and E. Os-
trom (1990), this is an essential feature of successful self-governance. The intensified integration 
of environmental psychology in institutional design would be in the interest of sustainable solu-
tions in environmental dilemmas. 
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